kolibrios-fun/programs/network/ssh/sshlib_dh_gex.inc
hidnplayr 97d2b9be48 Automatic algorithm selection.
git-svn-id: svn://kolibrios.org@9991 a494cfbc-eb01-0410-851d-a64ba20cac60
2024-03-10 18:38:46 +00:00

478 lines
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PHP

; sshlib_dh_gex.inc - Diffie Hellman Group exchange
;
; Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Jeffrey Amelynck
;
; This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
; the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
; (at your option) any later version.
;
; This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
; GNU General Public License for more details.
;
; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
; along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
; https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4419.txt
proc sshlib_dh_gex con_ptr
locals
mpint_tmp dd ?
mpint_p dd ?
mpint_g dd ?
mpint_x dd ?
mpint_e dd ?
mpint_f dd ?
mpint_K_big dd ?
k_h_ctx dd ?
temp_ctx dd ?
H dd ? ; exchange hash
K_length dd ?
session_id_x rb SHA2_256_LEN+1
str_K_S dd ? ; server public host key and certificates (K_S)
mpint_f_big dd ? ; pointer to original
str_s_of_H dd ? ; signature of H
endl
; Allocate memory for temp variables
mov ecx, 7*(MAX_BITS/8+4) + 2*LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN + 1*SHA2_256_LEN
mcall 68, 12
test eax, eax
jz .err_nomem
; Init pointers for temp variables
mov [mpint_tmp], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_p], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_g], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_x], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_e], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_f], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [mpint_K_big], eax
add eax, (MAX_BITS/8+4)
mov [k_h_ctx], eax
add eax, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN
mov [temp_ctx], eax
add eax, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN
mov [H], eax
add eax, SHA2_256_LEN
; Copy the partial exchange hash to our temporary one
mov esi, [con_ptr]
lea esi, [esi+sshlib_connection.part_ex_hash_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
;----------------------------------------------
; >> Send Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange Request
DEBUGF 2, "Sending DH group exchange request\n"
stdcall sshlib_send_packet, [con_ptr], ssh_msg_gex_req, ssh_msg_gex_req.length, 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
;---------------------------------------------
; << Parse Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange Group
stdcall sshlib_recv_packet, [con_ptr], 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
cmp [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_buffer.message_code], SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP
jne .err_proto
DEBUGF 2, "Received DH group\n"
lea esi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_buffer + sizeof.ssh_packet_header]
stdcall mpint_to_little_endian, [mpint_p], esi
add esi, 4
add esi, eax
DEBUGM 1, "DH modulus (p): ", [mpint_p]
stdcall mpint_to_little_endian, [mpint_g], esi
add esi, 4
add esi, eax
DEBUGM 1, "DH base (g): ", [mpint_g]
;-------------------------------------------
; >> Send Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange Init
; generate a random number x, where 1 < x < (p-1)/2
mov edi, [mpint_x]
mov dword[edi], DH_PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE/8
add edi, 4
mov ecx, DH_PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE/8/4
@@:
push ecx
call MBRandom
pop ecx
stosd
dec ecx
jnz @r
; If the highest bit is set, add a zero byte
shl eax, 1
jnc @f
mov byte[edi], 0
mov eax, [mpint_x]
inc dword[eax]
@@:
DEBUGM 1, "DH private key (x): ", [mpint_x]
; Compute e = g^x mod p
stdcall mpint_modexp, [mpint_e], [mpint_g], [mpint_x], [mpint_p]
stdcall mpint_shrink, [mpint_e]
DEBUGM 1, "DH public key (e): ", [mpint_e]
; Create group exchange init packet
mov byte[ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_buffer.message_code], SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT
lea edi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_buffer.message_code+1]
stdcall mpint_to_big_endian, edi, [mpint_e]
DEBUGF 2, "Sending GEX init\n"
mov ecx, dword[ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_buffer.message_code+1]
bswap ecx
add ecx, 5
lea esi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_buffer.message_code]
stdcall sshlib_send_packet, [con_ptr], esi, ecx, 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
;---------------------------------------------
; << Parse Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange Reply
stdcall sshlib_recv_packet, [con_ptr], 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
cmp [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_buffer.message_code], SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY
jne .err_proto
DEBUGF 2, "Received GEX Reply\n"
;--------------------------------
; HASH: string K_S, the host key
lea esi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_buffer + sizeof.ssh_packet_header]
mov [str_K_S], esi
mov edx, [esi]
bswap edx
add edx, 4
lea eax, [esi+edx]
mov [mpint_f_big], eax
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], esi, edx
;--------------------------------------------------------------------------
; HASH: uint32 min, minimal size in bits of an acceptable group
; uint32 n, preferred size in bits of the group the server will send
; uint32 max, maximal size in bits of an acceptable group
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], ssh_msg_gex_req+sizeof.ssh_packet_header-ssh_packet_header.message_code, 12
;----------------------------
; HASH: mpint p, safe prime
stdcall mpint_shrink, [mpint_p]
stdcall mpint_to_big_endian, [mpint_tmp], [mpint_p]
add eax, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], [mpint_tmp], eax
;----------------------------------------
; HASH: mpint g, generator for subgroup
stdcall mpint_shrink, [mpint_g]
stdcall mpint_to_big_endian, [mpint_tmp], [mpint_g]
add eax, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], [mpint_tmp], eax
;---------------------------------------------------
; HASH: mpint e, exchange value sent by the client
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea esi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_buffer + sizeof.ssh_packet_header]
mov edx, [esi]
bswap edx
add edx, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], esi, edx
;---------------------------------------------------
; HASH: mpint f, exchange value sent by the server
mov esi, [mpint_f_big]
mov edx, [esi]
bswap edx
add edx, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], esi, edx
stdcall mpint_to_little_endian, [mpint_f], [mpint_f_big]
mov esi, [mpint_f_big]
add esi, eax
add esi, 4
mov [str_s_of_H], esi
DEBUGM 1, "DH exchange value (f): ", [mpint_f]
;--------------------------------------
; Calculate shared secret K = f^x mod p
stdcall mpint_modexp, [mpint_tmp], [mpint_f], [mpint_x], [mpint_p]
stdcall mpint_shrink, [mpint_tmp]
DEBUGM 1, "DH shared secret (K): ", [mpint_tmp]
; We always need it in big endian order, so store it as such.
stdcall mpint_to_big_endian, [mpint_K_big], [mpint_tmp]
mov [K_length], eax
;-----------------------------------
; HASH: mpint K, the shared secret
add eax, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], [mpint_K_big], eax
;-------------------------------
; Finalize the exchange hash (H)
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov edi, [H]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
DEBUGF 1, "Exchange hash H: "
stdcall dump_hex, [H], SHA2_256_LEN/4
;--------------------------
; Set or get the session id
mov eax, [con_ptr]
cmp [eax + sshlib_connection.status], SSHLIB_CON_STAT_KEX_DONE
jae @f
; If first KEX, verify host public key
stdcall sshlib_host_verify, [con_ptr], [str_K_S], [str_s_of_H], [H], SHA2_256_LEN
test eax, eax
jnz .err_hostkey_verification
mov eax, [con_ptr]
mov esi, [H]
lea edi, [eax + sshlib_connection.session_id]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
@@:
lea esi, [eax + sshlib_connection.session_id]
lea edi, [session_id_x+1]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;-------------------------------------
; << Parse Diffie-Hellman New Keys MSG
DEBUGF 2, "Expecting New Keys message\n"
stdcall sshlib_recv_packet, [con_ptr], 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
cmp [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_buffer.message_code], SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS
jne .err_proto
DEBUGF 2, "Received New Keys\n"
;----------------------------------------------------
; >> Reply with New Keys message (Using the old keys)
stdcall sshlib_send_packet, [con_ptr], ssh_msg_new_keys, ssh_msg_new_keys.length, 0
cmp eax, 0
jl .err
;---------------
; Calculate keys
; First, calculate partial hash of K and H so we can re-use it for every key.
invoke sha2_256.init, [k_h_ctx]
mov ecx, [K_length]
add ecx, 4
invoke sha2_256.update, [k_h_ctx], [mpint_K_big], ecx
invoke sha2_256.update, [k_h_ctx], [H], SHA2_256_LEN
;---------------------------------------------------------------
; Initial IV client to server: HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'A'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_iv]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;---------------------------------------------------------------
; Initial IV server to client: HASH(K || H || "B" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'B'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_iv]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;-------------------------------------------------------------------
; Encryption key client to server: HASH(K || H || "C" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'C'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx+sshlib_connection.tx_enc_key]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx+sshlib_connection.tx_enc_key]
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edi, SHA2_256_LEN
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
add edi, 256/8
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;-------------------------------------------------------------------
; Encryption key server to client: HASH(K || H || "D" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'D'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx+sshlib_connection.rx_enc_key]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx+sshlib_connection.rx_enc_key]
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edi, SHA2_256_LEN
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
add edi, 256/8
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;------------------------------------------------------------------
; Integrity key client to server: HASH(K || H || "E" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'E'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.tx_int_key]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
;------------------------------------------------------------------
; Integrity key server to client: HASH(K || H || "F" || session_id)
mov esi, [k_h_ctx]
mov edi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN/4
rep movsd
lea edx, [session_id_x]
mov byte[edx], 'F'
invoke sha2_256.update, [temp_ctx], edx, SHA2_256_LEN+1
invoke sha2_256.finish, [temp_ctx]
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
lea edi, [ebx + sshlib_connection.rx_int_key]
mov esi, [temp_ctx]
mov ecx, SHA2_256_LEN/4
rep movsd
mov ebx, [con_ptr]
mov [ebx + sshlib_connection.status], SSHLIB_CON_STAT_KEX_DONE
xor eax, eax
.err:
push eax
xor eax, eax
mov ecx, (7*(MAX_BITS/8+4) + 2*LIBCRASH_CTX_LEN + 1*SHA2_256_LEN )/4
mov edi, [mpint_tmp]
rep stosd
mcall 68, 13, [mpint_tmp]
pop eax
ret
.err_hostkey_verification:
DEBUGF 3, "Hostkey verification failed!\n"
jmp .err
.err_nomem:
DEBUGF 3, "Out of memory during key exchange!\n"
mov eax, SSHLIB_ERR_NOMEM
ret
.err_proto:
DEBUGF 3, "Protocol error during key exchange!\n"
mov eax, SSHLIB_ERR_PROTOCOL
jmp .err
endp